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Suppose it is agreed both that God can create a world containing free beings which is 
better than one without and that such a world must contain evil. I take Comstock to be 
arguing that the absolute best God could do in order to achieve this good is through a 
process of evolution involving untold amounts of animal suffering. The good of human 
free will must be brought about on the backs of beasts; they bear the burden, while we 
enjoy the benefit. Two questions must be asked of Comstock’s proposal. First, is it true 
that this world is the best that God can do with respect to animal pain and human 
freedom? Second, what does this proposal say about the relationship between theism and 
the moral status of animals? 
 
Historically most Christians have held that human beings were instantly created by God, 
and in spite of Darwin, many continue to believe in Special Creation even now. While 
such a thesis is implausible now, it is clearly not a logical impossibility. If God could 
have brought about free human beings instantaneously, then why didn’t he? Comstock’s 
only suggestion is that perhaps an evolved world “would be more temporally complex 
and interesting, more of a challenge to create.” I have no idea what the “challenges” of 
creation might be for an all-powerful deity, but I would have thought that to create free 
beings instantaneously without involving the suffering of millions of other creatures is 
not only more impressive but also more noble. Given a choice between creating a world 
that is “temporally more complex and interesting” but involves much animal suffering, 
and a instantaneous and less complex one without animal suffering, it seems to me that a 
perfectly good deity should sacrifice aesthetics for ethics and choose the latter. 
 
Still, Comstock needs the evolutionary model, because that appears to be the situation of 
the actual world. Comstock’s second through sixth premises present a plausible enough 
picture about how animal mentality might evolve into human mentality. There are other 
possible evolutionary pictures, however. Indeed, Harrison’s theodicy, criticized in my 
paper, argues that it is logically possible that natural selection might have worked without 
animal conscious states at all. Given the little that is understood about the nature of 
consciousness, Harrison’s suggestion is implausible, but it is clearly not logically 
impossible. It could have been the case that human capacities to reason and make choices 
evolve from completely non-conscious analogues in infra-human ancestors. It might well 
have been that consciousness, like free will, emerged only in humans, and if so, God 
could have created free human beings without any animal suffering at all. So, it appears 
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that the world that contains animal suffering, i.e., the actual world, is not the best that 
God can create. 
 
Of course, Harrison’s suggestion eliminates evils for animals but also eliminates goods 
for them. Perhaps it’s not such a good world after all. I suppose that Comstock might well 
argue that the world that contains both animal pleasure and pain, etc., is a better one than 
that represented by Harrison. This would be a promising direction indeed, because the 
value of animal experience is determined by what is valuable for them, rather than their 
evolutionary value in producing us. Still, I prefer Hume’s suggestion that the Creator 
might have created animals motivated solely by pleasure without the capacity for 
suffering. And, I see no reason why such a world could not have been divinely evolved. 
Thus, from the standpoint of theism, animal suffering remains an inscrutable evil. 
 
Comstock’s approach to the problem of animal pain underscores the final point of my 
paper. As for Augustine, the problem of animal suffering becomes the problem of animal 
existence. Why did God create animals in the first place? Comstock’s answer, like 
Hick’s, is in terms of some purported human good, in this case free will. Theologically, 
animals (and animal pain) have instrumental value for human and divine ends. Animal 
suffering, on Comstock’s account, is justified not by any good to be enjoyed by animals, 
but rather, by the capacity for human freedom. Comstock’s suggested path for animal 
theodicy thus provides for some interesting twists on familiar if unfortunate theological 
themes. Let me rephrase my earlier claim. An ethical position that attributes moral 
standing to animals independently of their value for human ends stands in sharp contrast 
to the morality of theism.  
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